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Mexico has become a much more open econ-
omy over the past 20 years. And since the 1994
financial crisis, Mexican authorities have shown a
commitment to macroeconomic discipline.
Given this progress, many observers are
enthusiastic about the country’s prospects. Some,
in fact, wonder whether Mexico is about to take
off and become the world’s next economic tiger.
The evidence suggests, however, that much work
remains to be done before Mexico can catch up 
to First World nations the way countries such as
Singapore and South Korea did in the last few
decades.
Until the early 1980s, like most developing
nations, Mexico sharply restricted foreign invest-
ment and trade in hopes of expanding domestic
production capacity. But a severe financial crisis in
1982 prompted a change of tactics. Foreign invest-
ment limits were lifted in 1983 in some sectors. In
1985, Mexico announced it would join the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and did so the fol-
lowing year. Between 1985 and 1990, the country’s
maximum tariff fell from 100 percent to 20 per-
cent. Most sectors were opened to foreign invest-
ment in 1989, paving the way for a successful
wave of privatizations. By 1994, 80 percent of
In the late 1980s, the number of people receiving welfare benefits in
America began to rise. As the trend continued into the 1990s, a bipartisan coali-
tion searched for ways to reform the American welfare system. Convinced
that many welfare recipients could work if presented with appropriate incen-
tives, political leaders devised a welfare reform bill that was intended to pro-
mote self-sufficiency while retaining a social safety net for those who tem-
porarily have no other options.
The bill was intensely controversial. An influential policy adviser said the
bill would inflict “serious injury to American children.”
1 A senator who special-
izes in welfare issues said there was “absolutely no evidence that this radical
idea has even the slightest chance of success.”
2 And the Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities predicted that the most significant effect of welfare
reform would be “a large increase in poverty.”
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The icing on the cake came in the early
1990s with the implementation of
NAFTA, which secured Mexico’s access
to North American markets.
Mexico’s Transformation Triggers
Foreign Investment and Trade
This open policy has paid off.
Among developing nations today, only
China and Brazil receive more foreign
investment. In the past 20 years, foreign
investment—most of it from the United
States—has exploded (Chart 1).
Today, firms that receive foreign
direct investment account for over 20
percent of all employment in Mexico.
Naturally, not all regions have benefited
equally. In border states like Chihuahua
and Baja California, this employment
share exceeds 50 percent. But southern
states like Chiapas and Oaxaca have been
largely left out. In terms of economic
sectors, manufacturing leads in foreign
investment, followed by financial services.
Within manufacturing, the maquiladora
sector accounts for a third of all foreign
investment.
Exports have surged as well. Mexico’s
exports-to-GDP ratio has tripled since
1980, with manufacturing exports—
fueled by foreign investment—account-
ing for most of the boom (Chart 2).
Manufactured goods have replaced pri-
mary resources as Mexico’s main export.
The United States continues to
account for the bulk of Mexico’s exports
and investment inflows. It is the destina-
tion of almost 90 percent of Mexico’s
exports and the source of three-quarters
of all foreign investment. As a result,
Mexico’s economic performance depends
more than ever on U.S. economic activity.
Between 1994 and 2000, the U.S. expan-
sion enabled Mexico to grow faster than
any other Latin American economy. When
U.S. manufacturing began slowing in fall
2000, Mexico’s six-year expansion ended
in synchronicity.
Still Not a Success Story
Despite the recent slowdown, Mexico
is now Latin America’s largest economy
in U.S. dollar terms, suggesting that the
foreign trade and investment boom is
translating into higher economic growth.
In light of all the good news, it is tempt-
ing to ask whether Mexico is on the brink
of becoming the next development suc-
cess story.
Unfortunately, Mexico’s performance
since 1994 can’t hide the fact that much
work remains before it catches up with
First World economies. Real GDP per
capita almost doubled between 1965 and
1982, and the country was described as
an economic miracle. But the downturn
in oil prices and a series of financial
crises brought the miracle period to an
end. Mexico’s real GDP per capita today
is roughly what it was 20 years ago.
Why haven’t the sweeping policy
changes of the past 20 years enabled
Mexico to pick up where it left off in
1982?
Long-run growth requires an ex-
pansion of production capacity. Nations
accomplish this by mobilizing more
physical and human resources and be-
coming more productive by, for instance,
allocating resources better. Several East
Asian countries that were very poor in
the 1960s caught up with the industrial-
ized nations in about two generations by
doing this. These economic tigers in-
clude small countries like Singapore and
fairly large ones like South Korea.
Consider South Korea. In 1965, its
income per capita was half of Mexico’s
(Chart 3). By the late ’80s, however,
Korea had overtaken Mexico and is now
about twice as rich as its Latin American
counterpart. As with the other tigers,
Korea experienced an export boom, and
its exports-to-GDP ratio has quadrupled
since 1970 (Chart 4). Manufactured goods
accounted for most of the trade expan-
sion, as was the case for all the tigers. In
this respect, at least, Mexico does look
like a tiger.
But the key to development, and the
area where Mexico falls short, is finding
a way to quickly expand production
capacity. MIT economist Alwyn Young is
credited with establishing that on a basic
level, the tigers’ economic performance
is no mystery.
1 The East Asian tigers, he
showed, grew the way they did because
they mobilized physical and human re-
sources at a mind-boggling rate.
Again, consider South Korea. Its
investment-to-GDP ratio reached almost
40 percent in the late ’80s, very high by
international standards (Chart 5). Inter-
estingly, foreign investment did not play
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Cooperation and Development.a big role in this. The investment surge
was financed through exceptionally high
private and public domestic savings. By
contrast, Mexico’s investment rate, in
spite of the recent influx of foreign
money, has hovered around 20 percent
for most of the past 30 years.
South Korea’s fastest growing re-
source has been human capital. In 1960,
almost half the working population
lacked a primary school education
(Chart 6 ). Today, 70 percent of working
Koreans have at least some secondary
education. Mexico’s achievements in this
area remain dismal. A third of the work-
ing population has not completed pri-
mary school, and the country today stands
roughly where Korea did 40 years ago.
Making a Tiger Out of Mexico
As Nobel Prize economist Robert
Lucas once wrote, “If we know what an
economic miracle is, we ought to be able
to make one.” Why can’t Mexico repli-
cate what Korea did?
Several factors that contributed to
the success of the East Asian tigers may
be impossible to replicate. For instance,
the savings rates they achieved may not
be attainable or even desirable for most
emerging nations.
Nevertheless, all developing nations
can learn from the East Asian experi-
ence. The tigers provided several condi-
tions conducive to the accumulation of
physical resources. In most cases, they
committed early on to monetary and fis-
cal discipline and provided predictable
macroeconomic conditions for investors.
They also provided fairly efficient, stable
institutions, such as well-functioning legal
systems. As for human capital, the tigers
made a major effort to supply basic edu-
cation and health services during early
stages of their catch-up period. Mexico
has much work to do in all these areas.
Fiscal Uncertainty
Since its 1994 financial crisis, Mexico
has made progress in macroeconomic
discipline, bringing inflation down to its
lowest in 30 years and fiscal deficits to
below 1 percent of GDP. But the gov-
ernment continues to depend on unpre-
dictable oil sales for more than a third of
its revenues. The government has been
able to trim spending recently, but in the
long run, a credible commitment to fiscal
and monetary discipline demands that
Mexico reduce its dependence on oil
revenues. Bond prices plunged recently
when Finance Minister Francisco Gil
Diaz likened Mexico’s fiscal situation to
Argentina’s. The administration has since
tried to reassure financial markets, but
Gil Diaz’s words struck a sensitive chord.
Why is it so difficult for Mexico to
find more reliable sources of public reve-
nues? Although tax rates are not low by
international standards, many individuals
and corporations avoid income taxes
altogether, making the tax base small. In
Mexico, the informal sector accounts for
an amazing 50 percent of employment.
As a result, Mexico’s tax-to-GDP ratio is
markedly below Korea’s and the United
States’. In fact, it’s low even by Latin
American standards.
Inefficient Institutions
Ill-functioning institutions add to the
unpredictability of Mexico’s business en-
vironment. The biggest problem is that
property rights are not effectively en-
forced because of an inefficient legal sys-
tem. According to recent estimates, col-
lecting on a bad check takes five times
longer in Mexico than in the United
States. Resolving more complicated con-
tractual disputes can take several years.
This poor legal environment has
many negative consequences. Maybe the
most detrimental for growth, and a key
reason investment has stagnated, is the
impact on the financial sector. Mexican
banks are very hesitant to lend in an
environment where contracts are not
properly enforced. Chart 7 shows the
ratio of loans to the private sector to
GDP in the past 40 years in Mexico,
Korea and the United States. Mexico’s
financial sector is very small and, if any-
thing, getting smaller. In a recent World
Bank survey, over half of Mexican firms
described their access to financing as
severely limited, compared with 15 per-
cent of U.S. firms. In Singapore (Korea
wasn’t surveyed), only 10 percent of firms
reported that they face the same situation.
To make matters worse, even when
they can secure financing, Mexican entre-
preneurs face burdensome regulations
and a notoriously inefficient bureaucracy.
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42, Center for International Development, Harvard
University, April 2000.For example, it takes more than 65 days
on average to register a firm in Mexico,
compared with four days in the United
States.
On the education front, Mexico’s
poor performance is not due to low
spending but to its failure to emphasize
basic education. Korea made an early
commitment to basic education, and in
1970, two-thirds of the country’s educa-
tional spending was allocated to prepri-
mary and primary education (Chart 8).
As recently as 10 years ago, only a third
of Mexico’s education budget was allo-
cated to preprimary and primary educa-
tion. This share has increased to one half
in recent years, but it will take a genera-
tion for these efforts to begin paying off.
Toward Long-Term Growth
So what will it take for Mexico to
start growing like a tiger?
First, the government must find a
way to diminish its reliance on oil reve-
nues, perhaps by emphasizing consump-
tion taxation, since income taxation has
failed to generate sufficient revenue. Con-
sumption taxation has already shown
great potential in Mexico. When a lim-
ited value-added tax (VAT) was intro-
duced in 1978, the tax-to-GDP ratio
increased by 5 percentage points in two
years. President Fox’s attempts to ex-
pand the VAT base failed last year
because he was unable to assuage con-
cerns that the reform would hurt the
poor. Increased welfare spending may
prove necessary to pass the fiscal reform
Mexico needs.
2
Second, Mexico must improve the
country’s institutions. Mexico can learn
from the tigers, which made civil ser-
vants’ recruitment and promotion merit-
based and their pay competitive with the
private sector’s. As for the judiciary,
research suggests that simply devoting
more resources to the sector does little
to reduce court delays. On the other
hand, devoting a larger share of
resources to the reduction of procedural
times can prove very effective, as Peru
demonstrated in 1995.
3
Third, Mexico must continue fight-
ing its human capital deficit by targeting
basic education. 
Daunting as they may sound, these
are only some of the steps needed to
achieve long-term development. As with
many other Latin American nations, Mex-
ico direly needs labor market and energy
sector reforms. But although much work
remains to be done, the potential bene-
fits are enormous.
—Erwan Quintin
Quintin is a senior economist in the
Research Department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas.
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